The ceremony is expected to generate headlines, diplomatic optimism, and the familiar rhetoric of 'a new era for the region.' Yet none of these atmospherics change the fundamental reality: the durability of this agreement will depend almost entirely on the political will of the DR Congo government.
This is not a rhetorical flourish. It is an empirical observation grounded in decades of conflict patterns in eastern DRC. The structural conditions that fuel recurring instability, citizenship exclusion, hate-driven political narratives, institutional fragility, the presence of genocidal armed groups, and entrenched governance failures are overwhelmingly internal to the DRC. No external mediator, however influential, can correct these without Congolese leadership embracing difficult reforms.
There is a leadership crisis characterised by the problem of promises without policy.
President Félix Tshisekedi arrives in Washington with a long record of unfulfilled commitments to domestic and regional security arrangements. His administration has repeatedly signed agreements it lacked either the capacity or will to implement. Whether the 2019 Nairobi initiatives, the Luanda Roadmap, or commitments to demobilisation and disarmament frameworks, the pattern has been the same: rhetorical enthusiasm, shallow follow-through, and eventual reversal.
This inconsistency is not incidental; it reflects a deeper challenge within Congolese political culture, in which symbolic gestures substitute for structural reform. It is telling that, before departing for Washington, Tshisekedi sought the counsel of Kinshasa's senior witch doctors, an episode that, while anecdotal, illustrates a leadership more preoccupied with political optics and metaphysical 'protection' than with the governance responsibilities that produce stability. For regional peace, the risk is clear: a leader who cannot keep domestic promises is unlikely to sustain international ones.
For any peace agreement to endure, it must address the historical drivers of conflict, the most central of which is the persistent discrimination, delegitimisation, and periodic deadly violence against Congolese Kinyarwanda-speaking communities, particularly Congolese Tutsi.
This issue predates Tshisekedi, yet his administration has deepened it through incendiary political rhetoric, permissive silence toward hate speech, and reliance on political actors who scapegoat these communities as a convenient explanation for governance failures. The result has been institutionalised exclusion and a social environment in which certain Congolese citizens are continually portrayed as outsiders, irrespective of constitutional guarantees.
A peace agreement cannot bypass this. Rwanda and external brokers cannot legislate citizenship for Congolese Tutsi. Only Kinshasa can do that. Without a framework that secures equal rights, dismantles discriminatory narratives, and protects minorities from political manipulation, any agreement signed in Washington will become a ceasefire at best and a fragile one at that.
There is a problem of FDLR and the state's security contradictions. The continued presence of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) remains the most destabilising security paradox in eastern Congo. While officially designated an existential threat to Rwanda and the region, the FDLR has repeatedly been tolerated, incorporated, or politically instrumentalised by factions within the Congolese security apparatus. This duality of public denunciation alongside practical accommodation undermines any attempt at credible reform.
Unless Kinshasa adopts a clear, consistent, and enforceable policy toward the FDLR, dismantling its structures and ending its influence, no peace agreement with Rwanda can be operationalised. External witnesses cannot resolve a problem that the Congolese state itself treats ambiguously.
Nobody can ignore governance deficits in the DRC, which remain the silent obstacle to the implementation of any peace deal.
Beyond identity politics and government-sponsored armed groups lies a broader governance deficit: corruption, weak institutions, predatory local networks, and an often undisciplined military chain of command. These are not peripheral issues; they are core obstacles to peacebuilding. Agreements break not because signatories change their minds, but because state structures are too weak to implement obligations.
This is why the December 4 agreement risks becoming another symbolic document: excellent on paper, compromised in practice. Washington can provide momentum; Kigali can provide clarity; regional witnesses can provide oversight. But only Kinshasa can provide implementation.
For the Washington agreement to have a lifespan longer than its signing ceremony, several policy imperatives are unavoidable:
One, affirmation and enforcement of equal citizenship rights for all Congolese, including Kinyarwanda-speaking communities, with protection against discrimination and politically motivated violence.
Two, a comprehensive, time-bound strategy to dismantle the FDLR and affiliated structures, supported by regional cooperation and clear accountability mechanisms.
Three, a national framework to prosecute hate speech and ethnic incitement to hatred, including public officials who perpetuate dangerous narratives.
Four, strengthening institutional capacity in military command structures, border control, justice systems, and provincial governance. And lastly:
Ending the political incentive to externalise internal governance failures, replacing populist scapegoating with credible policy reform.
If these steps are not undertaken, the Washington agreement will become another entry in a long catalogue of well-intentioned but short-lived regional accords.
In conclusion, this peace deal requires more than signatures; it requires DRC's state responsibility.
The December 4 signing ceremony will generate diplomatic optimism, but optimism cannot substitute for political will. The DRC holds the master key to peace because the root causes of the conflict lie in its own governance challenges, identity politics, and security contradictions. Rwanda cannot resolve these on the DRC's behalf, nor can international brokers.
The question, therefore, is not whether Washington can produce an agreement. It can. The real question is whether Kinshasa can sustain one. Without profound internal reforms, rights protections, accountability, institutional strengthening, and a decisive break with the politics of exclusion, the agreement will be celebrated at noon and compromised by sunset.
For lasting peace in the Great Lakes, the signatures matter far less than the state that must honour them.
Tom Ndahiro
