Yet, as hopeful as the moment appears, it would be a mistake to assume that bilateral signatures alone can deliver a durable peace in eastern DRC. The roots of the crisis lie far deeper than cross-border tensions. They are Congolese at their core, and only a genuinely inclusive Inter-Congolese Dialogue can address them.
To begin with, the primary responsibility for stabilising the DRC rests squarely on Congolese institutions and citizens. External actors may facilitate, mediate, or provide leverage, but sustainable peace cannot be outsourced. Every major attempt to impose solutions from outside, whether through regional summits, coercive diplomacy, or hurried ceasefire signings, has eventually been overtaken by realities on the ground. The United States and Qatar, both now heavily involved, must recognise that their success hinges on empowering Congolese-led mechanisms rather than substituting for them.
This is precisely where the African Union (AU) should step forward. Among external actors, the AU is best positioned to understand the historical, political, and social complexities shaping conflict dynamics in eastern Congo. If Washington and Doha are truly committed to a durable settlement, they must not only allow the AU to take the driver's seat but also meaningfully support it, diplomatically and financially, throughout the process.
A peace framework designed without deep contextual understanding is doomed to collapse.
Recent developments underscore this urgency. Despite a ceasefire-monitoring framework brokered in Doha in October 2025, fighting resumed within weeks. As with previous agreements, each side accused the other of violations.
Meanwhile, the humanitarian toll continues to mount: an estimated 7.8 million Congolese are internally displaced, mostly across the eastern provinces. Public services have collapsed. Hunger levels rank among the highest in the world. Even as diplomatic teams meet in luxury hotels, millions face crisis-level deprivation.
Worse still, the conflict is no longer a confrontation between Kinshasa and a single rebel group. While M23 has dominated headlines, the battlefield is crowded with dozens of armed actors, from local militias to extremist factions linked to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).
Such fragmentation makes violence unpredictable and ceasefires difficult to enforce. Unless each relevant actor feels that its core grievances are acknowledged within a political framework, it will simply return to armed struggle.
This is why a new Inter-Congolese Dialogue, comprehensive, inclusive, and backed by strong guarantees, is indispensable.
There is a precedent: the Sun City Inter-Congolese Dialogue of the early 2000s. It was far from perfect, but it remains the most ambitious attempt to bring all Congolese stakeholders, government, armed groups, political opposition, civil society, and regional representatives to one negotiating table. Its successes matter. It significantly reduced nationwide fighting and laid groundwork for political transition. It provided a platform where diverse Congolese actors could articulate demands, negotiate compromises, and sketch a collective future.
But Sun City also failed in critical ways. It was only partially inclusive. Key groups, most notably RCD-Goma and several political factions, refused to sign. That absence of full buy-in fatally weakened the deal and undermined its durability. The result is the conflict landscape we see today: fragmented, unresolved, and easily reignited.
A new dialogue must not repeat those mistakes. Every meaningful armed actor, political force, and civil society constituency must be represented in the process, not for symbolic inclusion, but to ensure ownership of the outcome. The AU's stewardship, supported robustly by the US and Qatar, could guarantee neutrality while giving the process continental legitimacy. External mediators must resist the temptation to prioritise speed over substance.
A rushed agreement will be as fragile as the ceasefires that continue to collapse.
Ultimately, peace will not come from Kigali-Kinshasa agreements alone, nor from ceasefire monitoring frameworks negotiated in distant capitals. These are necessary but insufficient. Peace will come when Congolese actors, armed and unarmed, state and opposition, national and local, feel that the political framework reflects their realities and addresses their grievances.
The DRC has spent decades trapped in cycles of violence and superficial settlements. Breaking this cycle requires embracing a simple truth: without an inclusive Inter-Congolese Dialogue, every ceasefire will fail, and every peace accord will be short-lived.
If the international community truly wants to help, it must help Congo talk to itself. Only then can eastern DRC finally chart a road to peace.
The author is a University Don teaching Diplomacy and International Relations at the University of Rwanda.
Dr. Charles Kiiza
