Inside military tactics that liberated Rwanda #rwanda #RwOT

These are the words of Gen (Rtd) James Kabarebe, describing how the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) overcame the odds to liberate Rwanda. As of today, 31 years have passed since that historic victory.

All warfare requires strategy, but military conflict especially demands innovative and adaptive tactics. When the RPA launched the liberation war in 1990, it had spent years regrouping and preparing. Many of the men who started the war had served in the Ugandan military in various roles.

Maj Gen Fred Rwigyema led the first attack on October 1, 1990. He was a seasoned commander who had played a key role in Uganda's liberation war, serving as deputy to Gen Elly Tumwine, who was injured early in the conflict. Rwigyema took over from there.

However, the liberation of Rwanda did not begin as expected. On October 2, just one day after the war began, Maj Gen Rwigyema was killed. Other senior commanders, including Maj Chris Bunyenyezi and Maj Peter Bayingana, were also killed shortly after. Bayingana was ambushed on the road from Kagitumba to Gabiro, and Bunyenyezi was killed on the way from Nyagatare.

Initially, the RPA used conventional warfare, which is characterized by open, face-to-face engagements where opposing forces establish clear frontlines. This form of fighting dates back centuries and was historically done with spears and swords. Later, it evolved with the use of firearms and heavy artillery, tanks, and airplanes.

In both World Wars, tanks and aircraft became dominant in conventional warfare. Each side would dig trenches, set up defensive lines, and battle for control of enemy positions. But this method has major drawbacks: it's costly, predictable, and results in heavy casualties due to the mass concentration of troops in single locations.

This conventional approach was what the RPA relied on in the early days of the war. But everything changed when Maj Gen Paul Kagame returned from military training in the United States and took over the command of a demoralized and scattered army.

When Kagame arrived in Kagitumba, many soldiers were already seeking ways to retreat back to Uganda. Even Gen (Rtd) Fred Ibingira admitted that he was preparing to return to Uganda, as the battle seemed lost.

Kagame, referred to as "Afande PC," immediately called for a regrouping of the troops. In meetings with senior commanders, he urged them to reconsider retreating, arguing that going back was not an option. Their only goal should be to liberate Rwanda and stop the ongoing massacres against the Tutsi.

This photo of Maj Gen Paul Kagame was taken on May 11, 1994, in Byumba. At the time, he was in a meeting with José Ayala Lasso, the head of the UN Human Rights Commission.

At that moment, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) were celebrating, believing they had defeated the RPA completely. But Kagame introduced a new battle strategy: shifting from conventional to mobile and guerrilla warfare.

The first operation under this new tactic was the attack on Gatuna in early November, led by Col (Rtd) Twahirwa Ludovic, known as Dodo. It was a highly organized assault that greatly boosted morale among the troops, especially those who were just entering the battle and had not witnessed the chaos of the early days.

On the same day that Gatuna was captured, it was officially announced that Fred Rwigyema had died, news that brought sorrow but also renewed determination among the fighters.

The combined tactics of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare turned the tide of the liberation struggle. RPA troops relocated from Mutara to the Virunga mountains, from where they launched operations and conducted training.

Guerrilla warfare involves small, highly mobile units launching surprise attacks on enemy positions and then retreating. Even three soldiers could wreak havoc, creating the illusion of a much larger force. This method is ideal for ambushes, sabotage (e.g., destroying bridges), and psychological warfare, creating confusion and disorientation among enemy ranks.

Although sabotage is common in guerrilla tactics, the RPA avoided destroying key infrastructure since rebuilding would be a priority after liberation.

Former FAR soldiers have testified that they often felt disoriented, unsure of where to focus their defenses or what the RPA's next move would be.

Rtd Col Ludovic Dodo Twahirwa, wearing a red beret, was one of the key strategists who could skillfully map out how the battle should unfold.

Mobile warfare, while similar to guerrilla tactics, focuses more on identifying and targeting enemy weaknesses. It involves cutting off supply routes, surrounding the enemy, and defeating them decisively. It is faster-paced and relies heavily on intelligence and coordination among units.

Historically, mobile warfare was used effectively by Germany during the Blitzkrieg campaigns between 1939 and 1941, allowing rapid conquests of Poland, France, and Soviet territory. During the Korean War (1950â€"1953), Chinese forces used night raids and rapid movements to overwhelm their enemies. In 1967, during the Six-Day War, Israeli forces also applied mobile warfare tactics to defeat neighboring Arab armies swiftly.

The primary goal of mobile warfare is to win quickly, using strong internal coordination and real-time intelligence about enemy movements and vulnerabilities.

Thanks to the adaptation of these tactics, the RPA managed to withstand greater firepower, outmaneuver a better-equipped enemy, and ultimately liberate the countryâ€"proving that strategy, courage, and adaptability can overcome overwhelming odds.

Gen (Rtd) James Kabarebe is one of the soldiers who fought in the liberation struggle and has continued to contribute to the country's development to this day.